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V

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), because
this is an appeal over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Only one issue is presented by this appeal, and it is an issue of first impression in
this Court. Plaintiffs and Appellants (hereafter, unless otherwise noted, Plaintiffs and
Appellants are referred to collectively as "the Conatsers") challenge the partial denial of
the Conatsers' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, specifically that portion of the
district court's ruling wherein the court concluded, as a matter of law, that touching of the
streambed on Defendants' property is permissible only when it is incidental to navigating
the Weber River in a watercraft:
Where the use of the streambed is more than incidental to the
right of floating on natural waters, such use would constitute
a trespass.
Wading or walking along the river, where such conduct is not
incidental to the right of floatation upon natural waters, would
constitute a trespass of private property rights.
Judgment, Record ("Rec") at 00310; see also Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
Rec. at 00319 ("Where the use of the streambed is more that [sic] incidental to the right
of floating on natural waters, such use constitutes a trespass.").
These conclusions relate to a purely legal issue: the scope of the public easement
in public waters. See JJ.N.P. Co. v. State Div. of Wildlife Resources, 655 P.2d 1133,
1136 (Utah 1982) ("there is a public easement over the water regardless of who owns the
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water beds beneath the water"). The Conatsers contend that the district court erred by
construing the public easement in state waters as serving the narrow purposes of
navigation or floating, and therefore unduly restricted public use of the underlying lands
to only that contact deemed incidental to navigation or floating. The Conatsers submit
that waters in Utah are owned by the public not merely to serve purposes of navigation,
but "for the benefit and welfare of the people of the State as a whole," Id. at 1136.
Accordingly, the public easement in waters is to be interpreted broadly, as serving all
appropriate public uses, specifically including recreation. See id. (noting that "state
policy recognizes an interest of the public in the use of state waters for recreational
purposes"). If, as the Conatsers contend, the public easement in state waters is for the
purpose of recreation (among other things), then they should have the right to make
contact with the bed underlying the Weber River, so long as the contact is incidental to
recreation.
This case is before the Court on appeal from a partial grant/partial denial of
Conatser's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. "Appellate courts review a grant of
summary judgment for correctness and afford no deference to [the trial court's]
conclusions of l a w . . . . [0]n appeal the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party." Johnson v. Utah Dept. of Tramp., 133 P.3d 402, 406 (Utah
2006) (citations omitted). There were no facts disputed in connection with the parties
cross motions for summary judgment, Memorandum Decision, Rec. at 00298, and none
of the district court's factual findings are challenged on appeal. See Statement of Issues,
filed June 21, 2006.
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Determining the scope of an easement is a question of law.

Valcarce v.

Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998). Where, as here, the issues on appeal are
"purely legal in nature," the appellate court reviews the "district court's decision for
correctness, without deference." Thompson v. Utah State Tax Comrn'n, 112 P.3d 1205,
1207 (Utah 2004); see also Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah
1996) (noting that the trial court's interpretation of the effect of a prior judicial decision
is a conclusion of law, reviewed for correctness).
This issue was preserved in the trial court - indeed, it was the central issue in the
Conatsers' claim for declaratory judgment.

See First Amended Complaint, Rec. at

00015-020. It was an issue in the Conatsers' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
Rec. at 00131, and it was an issue on which the trial court rendered a specific ruling and
judgment. Memorandum Decision, Rec. at 00303-04; Judgment, Rec. at 00310-11.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Conatsers brought this case as a declaratory judgment action in the Second
Judicial District Court for Morgan County, seeking a judicial determination that they
enjoyed the right, as members of the general public, to use for recreational purposes that
portion of the Weber River crossing Defendants' properties, and specifically that the
Conatsers had the right: (1) to float down the Weber River in a "raft, boat, or other
floating conveyance"; (2) to make contact with the bed of the Weber River in ways
incidental to floating, such as by touching the river bottom with oars, fishing tackle, swim
fins, the bottom of the boat, etc.; (3) to walk on the bed of the Weber River; and (4) the
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right to travel in the Weber River, whether by floating or walking, unimpeded by fences
or barbed wire strung across the river. See First Amended Complaint, Rec. at 00019-20.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the purely legal issue of
the Conatsers5 rights, as members of the public, to use the Weber River and its bed as it
crosses Defendants' properties.1 Judge Michael D. Lyon ruled that the Conatsers, as
members of the public, have the right to float down the Weber River, and to make contact
with the bed of the Weber River so long as the contact is incidental to floating. Judge
Lyon also ruled, however, that any contact with the streambed "more than incidental to
the right of floating" would constitute a trespass. Judgment, Rec. at 00309-11. The
district court also ruled that Defendants had "no legal right to erect fences to prevent
plaintiffs from utilizing the public's easement to float down the river." Id., Rec. at
00310.
Defendants did not appeal from the Judgment.

The Conatsers filed a timely

appeal, see Notice of Appeal, Rec. at 00333-35, and challenge only that portion of the
Judgment limiting the Conatsers' right to make contact with the bed of the Weber River
to uses of the streambed that are incidental to floating or navigation in or on the Weber
River itself. See supra, p. 1.

Defendants also argued that a declaratory judgment action was not a proper vehicle for
the Conatsers' claims. Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Rec, at
00222-24. The district court ruled against Defendants on that point, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, Rec. at 00315-18, and Defendants did not appeal that ruling.
921357 3
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The relevant facts were first set out in the Conatsers' complaint, Rec. at 00015-20,
and were undisputed in essentially the same format at summary judgment. Memorandum
Decision, Rec. at 00298. The district court more or less adopted the same statement of
facts in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Rec. at 00313-15, and the Conatsers
do not appeal those findings. The facts are as follows:
On or about June 4, 2000, the Conatsers put a rubber raft in the Weber River at a
public access point and proceeded to float down the river to another public access point
where they exited the river. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Rec. at 00314.
Between the public access points, the river crosses parcels of property that are in private
ownership. Id. While floating the river, the Conatsers touched the streambed in the
following ways: (1) the raft in which they rode touched or skidded along the bottom in
shallow areas; (2) their paddles or oars touched the bottom on occasion; (3) Kevin
Conatser's fishing tackle came in contact with the bottom; and (4) Kevin Conatser
intentionally got out of the raft and walked along the bottom of the river to facilitate his
fishing and to manipulate fencing that had been strung over the river by the property
owners. Id.
Defendants Duane Johnson and Wayne Johnson confronted the Conatsers and
ordered them off of the river. Id. Specifically, Duane and Wayne Johnson told the
Conatsers to pick up their raft and walk out via a railroad easement that runs parallel and
nearly adjacent to the river. Id. Instead, the Conatsers continued downstream to a public
access point, where the Johnsons and the Morgan County Deputy Sheriff were waiting
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for them. Id., Rec. at 00315.

The Deputy Sheriff cited Kevin Conatser and Jodi

Conatser for criminal trespass. Id.; see also First Amended Complaint, Rec. at 00017.
The Morgan County Justice Court found the Conatsers guilty of criminal trespass, but on
appeal to district court, Morgan County dismissed the charges due to the uncertainty
regarding the Conatsers' status as trespassers. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
Rec. at 00315. Because there was a long-running dispute between the Conatsers and
Defendants regarding the Conatsers' rights to use the Weber River, id., the Conatsers
brought this declaratory judgment action in Second Judicial District Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Though most states still adhere to a modified version of the common law test of
navigability to determine public rights to use natural waters, Utah has abandoned
navigability as a test for finding public rights. Instead, Utah has adopted the "doctrine of
public ownership," which holds that all waters of the state are owned by the public, to be
used for the public benefit and welfare.
This Court has characterized the public's rights in natural waters as an easement
for the purposes of, among other things, recreation. Familiar rules of real property law
dictate that the public easement includes all rights necessary to fully enjoy it. Because
walking on the soil underlying the public waters is reasonably necessary to fully enjoy
the recreational easement, and because such walking imposes no significant burden on
the fee owner, the public recreational easement in waters of the state should be
interpreted to include, as a necessary incident thereto, the right to stand and walk on the
riverbed.

921357 3
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ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION
This is an easement case - an atypical one, perhaps, but an easement case

nonetheless. The easement at issue is the public easement in waters of the state, first
articulated by this Court in JJ.N.P. Co. v. State, 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982):
A corollary of the proposition that the public owns the water
is the rule that there is a public easement over the water
regardless of who owns the water beds beneath the water.
Therefore, public waters do not trespass in areas where they
naturally appear, and the public does not trespass when upon
such waters.
Id. at 1136. The Conatsers seek a ruling that this public easement in the Weber River,
where it flows across Defendants' property, includes the right to walk on the bed of the
river in connection with recreational use of the river itself.
This general area of law - dealing with public versus private rights in natural
waters - is an ancient one, dating back to the earliest days of both the common law and
the civil law. See generally Harrison C. Dunning, 4 Waters and Water Rights ch. 29
(Robert E. Beck ed., 1996). Through most of the history of the common law, public
rights in waters have been tied to the concept of "navigability." In medieval England, the
primary use of waters by the public was for travel or navigation, id. at § 29.02(b), and the
common law recognized public rights of navigation in all "navigable waters," which the
common law defined as those waters influenced by the ebb and flow of the tides. See id.,
see also R.L. Knuth, Bases for the Legal Establishment of a Public Right of Recreation in
Utah's "Non-Navigable" Waters, 5 J. Contemp. L. 95, 96-97 (1978).

921357.3
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In the United States, courts recognized that the common law definition of
navigability was poorly suited to North American geography - limiting public rights to
waters affected by the tides would be too restrictive, rendering large bodies of inland
waters subject to private control. See Knuth, 5 J. Contemp. L., at 97-98, and cases cited
therein. Accordingly, American courts set about redefining the concept of navigability in
order to strike a more appropriate balance between public and private rights in waters.
Most states today still analyze questions regarding public rights in waters through some
sort of navigability framework - though the definition of navigability often bears little
resemblance to its English predecessor. In other states, including Utah, courts have more
or less jettisoned the concept of navigability as an obsolete or unnecessary test for public
rights in waters, in light of constitutional or statutory declarations that all waters are
owned by the public.
Notwithstanding that Utah law has never conditioned public rights in water on
navigability, a brief discussion of navigability is nevertheless appropriate, because the
concept of navigability permeates the vast body of case law considering public rights in
waters, making it a concept both difficult to ignore and important to understand.
Following a brief discussion of navigability, the argument will circle back to the
original assertion - that this is an easement case - and demonstrate that under familiar
rules of real property law, the public easement in the waters of the state should be
interpreted to include the incidental right to walk on the lands submerged beneath public
waters.

9213573
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The final section of the Brief looks at relevant precedent from the small handful of
other states that, like Utah, analyze public rights in water in light of public ownership,
and argues that the better reasoned of those decisions find a public right to walk on
private lands submerged under public waters.
II.

"NAVIGABILITY" HAS LITTLE RELEVANCE TO THIS CASE,
The concept of navigability has both evolved and splintered since its origins in

England, such that today, the term "navigable" is something of a legal chameleon, taking
on "different meanings dependent upon the problem under consideration." Hitchings v.
Del Rio Woods Recreation and Park Dist, 127 CaLRptr. 830, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(going on to describe federal navigability tests for commerce clause and title purposes,
and state recreational navigability test). For the purposes of this Brief, two versions of
navigability are deserving of some discussion: federal navigability for title, and state
recreational navigability.
A.

The "Federal Navigability" Test for Title Purposes is Not at Issue in
this Case.

Perhaps the most familiar test of navigability is the one used to determine title to
submerged lands. Under this version of navigability - sometimes termed "navigability
for title" or navigability in the "federal sense" (hereafter "federal navigability") - title to
land under navigable waters rests with the state, rather than with riparian owners. Utah v.
United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971). Waters are deemed federally navigable if they are
used, or are susceptible to use in their natural condition, for purposes of trade and
commerce, determined as of the date the state entered the union. Id,
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The issue of federal navigability is not before this Court. Neither party offered
evidence before the district court that the Weber River is a federally navigable water.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Rec. at 00315. Further, the district court held
that a finding on the issue of federal navigability was not necessary to the decision, id.9
Rec. at 00318, and that conclusion is not challenged on appeal. More importantly, that
conclusion is correct, in that it is in accord with the decisions of this court and other state
courts that have considered the question. See J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136-37 (treating
ownership of the bed as irrelevant to issue of public use in waters); see also Hitchings,
111 Cal.Rptr. at 837 ("the question of title to the bed of a navigable stream is not raised
in this action to determine public use rights, nor is it relevant to the issues herein
presented for decision.")- Thus, federal navigability is not at issue in this case.
B.

"Recreational Navigability" is Not the Law in Utah.

Beginning well over a century ago, state courts from around the country began to
fashion new and broader definitions of navigability, definitions that often had little to do
with the actual ability to float watercraft. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn.
1893) is an early and oft-cited example of this trend. In that case, the court noted that
"[t]he division of waters into navigable and nonnavigable is but a way of dividing them
into public and private waters," id. at 1143, and went on to suggest that the traditional
link of public use to navigation made little sense:
Many, if not the most, of the meandered lakes of this state,
are not adapted to, and probably will never be used to any
great extent for, commercial navigation; but they are used and as population increases, and towns and cities are built up
in their vicinity, will be still more used - by the people for
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sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing, skating, taking
water for domestic, agricultural, and even city purposes,
cutting ice, and other public purposes which cannot now be
enumerated or even anticipated. To hand over all these lakes
to private ownership, under any old or narrow test of
navigability, would be a great wrong upon the public for all
time, the extent of which cannot, perhaps, be now even
anticipated.
Id. The Lamprey court ultimately adopted a modified navigability standard, under which
any water capable of supporting navigation by pleasure boats would be considered
"navigable," but as the language quoted above illustrates, the Lamprey court extended
public rights in navigable waters to many uses having little or nothing to do with
navigation - by pleasure boat or otherwise. Id. at 1143-44.
In the subsequent decades, many states adopted similar "recreational navigability"
approaches, retaining "navigability" as the touchstone of public rights in waters, but
fashioning less restrictive tests in order to broaden the class of waters deemed navigable,
and/or recognizing broad public rights in navigable waters, which rights often have no
connection to traditional navigation. State v. BunkowskU 503 P.2d 1231, 1234 (Nev.
1972) ("many states have adopted varying and less stringent tests than the federal test in
order to establish the right of public use in certain watercourses.").
Of the states taking this "recreational navigability" approach, only a few have
squarely addressed the question presented here - whether the public has the right to walk
on the bed of public waters while recreating or in pursuit of other lawful activities. Those
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states that have considered the question have generally found that such a public right
exists.2
Nevertheless, "the great majority" of cases from the recreational navigability
states "are of limited helpfulness," Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 144 (Wyo. 1961),
because Utah - like Wyoming, New Mexico, and Montana - does not consider
navigability relevant to questions of public use:
Although "navigability" is a standard used to determine title
to waterbeds, it does not establish the extent of the State's
interest in the waters of the State.
J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136. Rather, in Utah, the public right to use natural waters derives
from a far more straightforward conceptual framework: the "doctrine of public
ownership."3 Id.

2

In Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1954), for instance, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that waters navigable under state law were "common highways" pursuant to
statute, that the defendant's fee ownership of the riverbed was subject to a public
highway easement "for travel and passage by floating and by wading," and that therefore
plaintiff was not in trespass when he waded down the stream to fish. Id. at 25-27. See
also Collins v. Gerhardt, 211 N.W. 115, 116-18 (Mich. 1926) (finding no trespass in the
defendant's wading and fishing in the Pine River, since it was capable of floating logs
and therefore "navigable" under state law, such that bed of river was subject to a public
trust for not only navigation, but for fishing also); Munninghoff v. Wisconsin
Conservation Commission, 38 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Wis. 1949) (agreeing that right of
navigation "includes incidental use of the bottom" where such use "is connected with
navigation, such as walking as a trout fisherman does in a navigable stream").
3

Navigability is anything but straightforward. The body of navigability case law is vast,
often confusing, and generally difficult to synthesize into coherent principles or
approaches. While it is interesting that "the courts in general uphold the right of the
public to fish in navigable waters," it can be exasperating that they "do not always
indulge in a uniform line of reasoning in reaching that result." Collins, 211 N.W. at 119
(Fellows, J. concurring). Fortunately, Utah law is unencumbered by the baggage of this
inconsistent and confusing body of navigability law.
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In short, the concept of navigability has little, if any, relevance to this case. Utah
has never relied on the concept of navigability as determinative of public rights to waters,
id., and the federal test of navigability, employed to determine ownership of submerged
lands, is not at issue. See supra, p. 9-10.
III.

UNDER UTAH'S DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF WATERS,
THE PUBLIC HAS THE RIGHT TO WALK ON THE GROUND
UNDERLYING PUBLIC WATERS, AS AN INCIDENT TO LAWFUL
USES OF THE WATERS,
As noted above, the Court need not concern itself with applying any sort of

navigability test in order to resolve the instant dispute. In Utah, all waters are owned by
the public, and the public holds an easement to use that water, even when it lies over
privately owned lands.

The only question before the Court is whether that public

easement includes the incidental right to walk on the underlying bed.
A.

Utah adheres to the Doctrine of Public Ownership of Waters.

While Utah courts have applied the federal test of navigability to determine title to
submerged lands, Monroe v. State, 175 P.2d 759 (Utah 1946), navigability has never been
a part of the analysis of public rights:
Although "navigability" is a standard used to determine title
to waterbeds, it does not establish the extent of the State's
interest in the waters of the State.
J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136.

Rather, in Utah, under a long-standing legislative

pronouncement,
All waters in this state, whether above or under the ground
are hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject
to all existing rights to the use thereof.
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Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 (emphasis added); see also Adams v. Portage Irr. Reservoir
and Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 652-53 (Utah 1937) (stating that title to water "flowing in
natural channels" is in the public and that such waters are "the gift of Providence; they
belong to us all as nature placed them"). In J.J.N.P., this Court explained that the
"doctrine of public ownership," as expressed by the above-quoted statute, "is founded on
the principle that water, a scarce and essential resource in this area of the country, is
indispensable to the welfare of all the people. . .." 655 P.2d at 1136.
Thus, case law from "recreational navigability" states is of limited relevance; the
questions presented by this appeal should be considered within the framework of public
ownership of water.
B,

Under the Doctrine of Public Ownership, the Weber River is a Public
Water.

As already noted, Utah law skips the intermediate question of navigability and
goes right to the fundamental issue: "[wjaters in this state are of two classes, public
waters and private waters." Adams, 72 P.2d at 652. By statute, all waters of the state fall
into the first class, public waters, unless and until they are lawfully appropriated for a
beneficial use. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1; see also Adams, 72 P.2d at 652 (explaining that
waters become private only when lawfully reduced to actual, physical possession and
control, as through appropriation into a ditch or canal).
The water at issue here is the Weber River as it crosses Defendants' properties. In
this location, where the Conatsers were floating and fishing, and where Kevin Conatser
waded in the river and walked on the riverbed to fish and to move fencing out of the way
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of the Conatsers' raft, the waters of the Weber River have not been reduced to physical
possession or control. Under the test articulated in Adams, 72 P.2d at 652, these waters
are undeniably public. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Rec. at 00319.
C.

The Public Easement in the Weber River includes the Right to Walk on
the Underlying Bed.

Since the public owns the waters of the state, it follows that the public has the
right to use the waters of the state wherever they naturally appear. The J J.N.P. court
described this public right to use public waters as an easement:
A corollary of the proposition that the public owns the water
is the rule that there is a public easement over the water
regardless of who owns the water beds beneath the water.
Therefore, public waters do not trespass where they naturally
appear, and the public does not trespass when upon such
waters.
655P.2datll36.
The district court followed the J.J.N.P. holding, ruling that Conatser was not in
trespass so long as he was floating upon the public waters of the Weber River. Judgment,
Rec. at 00309-10. The district court, however, was also called on to decide whether
Kevin Conatser was in trespass when he made contact with the bed of the Weber River,
both when the contact was incidental to floating, and when it was not incidental to
floating. On this question, J.J.N.P. is expressly silent:
As to whether the public has an easement in the beds of
streams and lakes, we express no opinion.
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655 P.2d at 1138, n. 6.4 Thus, the district court's ruling lacked the benefit of guidance
from this Court as to the scope of the public easement in public waters.
While the specific question presented here is one of first impression in Utah, there
is an abundance of Utah case law dealing with various types of easements, and the
principles developed in those cases are equally applicable here.
As with any easement case, the present dispute requires a balancing of interests
between the easement holders and the servient estate: "[wjhenever there is ownership of
property subject to an easement there is a dichotomy of interests, both of which must be
respected and kept in balance." North Union Canal Co. v. Newell, 550 P.2d 178, 179
(Utah 1976). The goal is to allow both the easement holder and the servient estate to
enjoy their respective property interests to the fullest extent possible, not inconsistent
with the interests of the other. Id. There is no specific test, or list of factors, that courts
must consider in determining an appropriate balance of interests. Rather, the inquiry is
essentially one of reasonableness, weighing the benefits to the easement holder against
the burdens imposed on the servient estate:
In construing any grant of right of way the use, in character
and extent, is limited to such as is reasonably necessary and
convenient to the dominant estate and as little burdensome to
the servient estate as possible for the use contemplated.
Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127, 1133 (Utah 1916). Courts typically look first at whether
the disputed use is reasonable, given the purposes of the easement, and then examine
whether the disputed use unnecessarily burdens the servient estate. See, e.g., Valcarce v.
4

The facts of JJ.N.P. did not involve wading, and therefore this Court had no reason to
rule on the issue.
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Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998). The reasonableness of Kevin Conatser's use
of the riverbed, and the burden imposed on Defendants by that use, will be considered in
turn.
1.

Walking on the soil underlying public waters is a reasonably
necessary incidental use of the public easement for recreation in
public waters.

The uses reasonable and allowed under an easement must be decided with
reference to the purpose of the easement. In other words, the scope of an easement "must
be determined by the purposes of the grant and the requirements for a safe, proper,
reasonable and convenient enjoyment thereof." Salt Lake City v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc.,
253 P.2d 365, 368 (Utah 1953).5
The public easement described in J J.N. P. is intended for, among other things,
"recreational purposes." 655 P.2d at 1136 (reasoning that "state policy recognizes an
interest of the public in the use of state waters for recreational purposes by requiring that
recreational uses be considered by the State Engineer before he approves an application
for appropriation, § 73-3-8, or permits the relocation of a stream, § 73-3-29."). The
J. J.N.P. court specifically listed several types of recreation falling within the scope of the
easement:

5

See also 4 R. Powell & P. Rohan, Powell on Real Property § 34.12 (Matthew Bender
2000) ("[T]he parties are to be presumed to have contemplated such a scope for the
created easement as would reasonably serve the purposes of the grant."); Restatement
(Third) Servitudes §4.1 (easement should be interpreted "to carry out the purpose for
which it was created."); Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 927 (Colo.
1997) ("In determining whether the scope of an easement or privilege has been exceeded,
a court must look to its nature and purpose.").
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Irrespective of the ownership of the bed and navigability of
the water, the public, if it can obtain lawful access to a body
of water, has the right to float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and
participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that water.
M a t 1137.
The trial court deemed Kevin Conatser in trespass not because he was fishing fishing is expressly a use within the scope of the public easement. Rather, Conatser was
deemed to be in trespass because he set foot on property - the bed of the Weber River that, unlike the water of the Weber River, is not owned by the public. In other words,
while Conatser's use was within the scope of the easement's purposes, the district court
found that the location of his use was outside the scope of the easement.
The district court's ruling is in error because it fails to recognize that an easement
always carries with it any incidental rights necessary to fully enjoy the easement: "The
owner of an easement is said to have all rights incident or necessary to its proper
enjoyment. . . . " 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements § 81 (1996), quoted in U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A.
General, Inc., 990 P.2d 945, 955 n.5 (Utah App. 1999); see also IB. & R.E. Walker, 253
P.2d at 368 (stating that extent of easement must include "such uses as are reasonably
sufficient for accomplishment of the objects of the grant."); Simon v. State, 996 P.2d
1211, 1215 (Alaska 2000) (holding that highway easement included right to lower the
grade and dispose of subsurface materials because "[c]ourts consistently find that an
easement gives the holder the right to use the land to the extent necessary to serve the
purpose of the easement.").
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This concept of "incidental rights" is a familiar one in Utah law, especially in the
context of canal easements. The owner of an easement for a ditch to transport water
holds the concomitant right to enter onto the lands of another for the purpose of
maintaining the ditch. This principle enjoys a long heritage in Utah law:
. . . the ditch or canal constitutes an easement over
respondent's land which appellant had a right to maintain,
and for that purpose has a right to go upon the land of
respondent along the ditch, and to use so much thereof on
either side of the ditch as may be necessary to make all
necessary repairs and to clean out said ditch at all reasonable
times....
Holm v. Davis, 125 P. 403, 407 (Utah 1912); see also Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co.
v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 163 (Utah 1946) (Larson, J., concurring) ("the right to convey
water through a ditch necessarily involves the right to maintain a ditch to convey the
water."); United States v. 3.08 Acres of Land, 209 F.Supp. 652, 659 (D. Utah 1962) ("The
right to reasonably maintain such a canal, including the right to operate the fifty foot
boom if reasonably necessary ... must be considered to be included in the reserved
easement").

This maintenance right, attendant to a ditch easement, is sometimes

considered an easement in itself, termed a "secondary easement." See J.B. & R.E.
Walker, 253 P.2d at 368. The concept of the maintenance easement evinces Utah courts'
recognition that in order to fully enjoy an easement for water conveyance, it is necessary
for the easement holder to enter and use parts of the servient estate not subject to the
principal easement.
Looking beyond Utah case law, it is apparent that the concept of incidental rights
has been broadly applied to a variety of easements. See, e.g., Knapp v. County of
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Livingston, 667 N.Y.S.2d 662, 668 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (easement for drainage pipe
included incidental right to enter dominant estate for purposes of maintenance and
repair); Cunningham v. Otero County Electric Cooperative, Inc., 845 P.2d 833, 837
(N.M. Ct. App. 1992) ("Courts have long recognized the right of power companies to
prevent the erection of structures and other obstructions beneath transmission lines
incident to rights acquired under a power line easement."); Boydstun Beach Ass'n v.
Allen, 723 P.2d 914, 922 (Idaho App.. 1986) (finding that right to build and use a dock
was a necessary incident to an easement for boating on lake).
The law also recognizes the doctrine of incidental rights in a different, but
conceptually similar, area of real property law, that of split mineral and surface estates.
Ownership of the mineral estate carries with it, as a necessary incident of mineral
ownership, the right to enter and use the surface estate:
It is a well established doctrine from the earliest days of the
common law, that the right to the minerals thus reserved
carries with it the right to enter, dig and carry them away, and
all other such incidents thereto as are necessary to be used for
getting and enjoying them.
Cowan v. Hardeman, 26 Texas 217, 222 (1862). Utah follows this rule. See Flying
Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976) ("ownership . . . of mineral rights
in land is dominant over the rights of the owner of the fee to the extent reasonably
necessary to extract the minerals therefrom.").6

6

As a matter of largely academic concern, counsel notes that, arguably, the concept of
split estates more accurately captures the relationship between the public and the fee
owners of submerged lands than does an easement-based analysis. Water should not
require an easement to exist where it naturally flows or pools. Water, after all, is real
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This Court may take judicial notice of the fact that people engaged in fishing often
do so by wading into the water itself, walking up or downstream in pursuit of a favorable
spot. See Utah R. Evid. 201 adv. cmte. note (stating that rule applies only to adjudicative
facts, and that judicial notice of legislative facts is left to discretion of appellate court);
see also Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 289 P. 116 (Utah 1930) ("a court is
presumed to know what every man of ordinary intelligence must know about such
things.")- Several courts, considering questions similar to those presented here, have
acknowledged that wading is a customary method of fishing. See, e.g., Munninghoff, 38
N.W.2d at 716 (stating that incidental use of the riverbed includes "walking as a trout

property in its own right, and can be in trespass no more than a vein of minerals can be in
trespass where it naturally exists.
The water of the state, however, is owned by the public, and as such, there is a severance
of the "water estate" from the surface estate, just as there is a severance of the mineral
estate from the surface estate when they are in separate ownership.
Under this view, the public's right to use public water is not in the nature of an easement,
because the public should not need an easement to use waters that it owns. See Madison
v. Graham, 126 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1324 (D. Mont. 2001) (stating that public floating did
"not necessarily involve[e] any easement over private land at all," since there was "no
public touching of the private streambed but only public use of a public resource."). As
with minerals, ownership of the "water estate" ("aqueous estate"?) should carry with it
the right to make reasonably necessary use of the surface estate. Only this incidental
right would properly be characterized as an easement. Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 927 (Colo. 1997) (stating that the mineral owner's right of
surface access "is in the nature of an implied easement, since it entitles the holder to a
limited right to use the land in order to reach and extract the minerals.").
Again, though, the difference would seem to be of only academic concern, since the
Court employs the same analytical framework to resolve split estate disputes as it does to
resolve easement questions. See Flying Diamond, 551 P.2d at 511 ("[WJherever there
exist separate ownerships of interests in the same land, each should have the right to the
use and enjoyment of his interest in the property to the highest degree possible not
inconsistent with the rights of the other."). At any rate, because J.J.N.P. describes the
interest as an easement, this Brief follows that framework.
921357.3

21

fisherman does in a navigable stream"); State v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 451
(N.M. 1947) (noting that when waters are public "they are no less so when they flow
across an owner's land at a depth requiring one to tread upon the land itself in order to
enjoy fishery in them.") (Sadler, J., dissenting).
In short, walking on the bed of a river is a reasonable and customary method of
fishing, and use of the riverbed for that purpose is a reasonably necessary and convenient
incidental use of the public easement in the river itself In other words, without the right
to walk on the bed, Conatser and other anglers like him will be denied the full use of the
public easement to fish in waters of the state.
2.

Walking on the bed of the river imposes no undue burden on the
servient estate.

The other side of the balancing of interests requires an assessment of the burden
imposed on the servient estate by the disputed use of the easement. See Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998). Naturally, this assessment should distinguish
between the burdens already imposed on Defendant's property, and the additional burden
represented by contact with the bed of the river by waders. Only the latter burdens
should be weighed against the reasonableness of the disputed use.
In that regard, it is worth noting the obvious - that the submerged lands at issue
here are submerged. Being continually or periodically covered with water, the lands up
n

The analysis herein focuses on fishing, because that is the recreational use giving rise to
this dispute. It is worth mentioning, however, that stepping on the bed of the river is a
necessary incident to other recreational uses as well. Swimming may be the most striking
example, because it is hard to imagine how a member of the public could enter the Weber
River to enjoy his or her right to swim therein, and exit the river when finished, without
making contact with the bed of the river.
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to the mean high water mark are not valuable for agriculture or development, and
obviously cannot be used or occupied by their owner in the same manner as adjacent
uplands.8
Furthermore, submerged lands are subject to a variety of burdens imposed by state
and federal law. For instance, state law forbids the landowners from altering the beds
and banks of natural watercourses without first receiving written approval from the State
Engineer. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-29 (requiring State Engineer to consider and
protect recreational uses when considering applications for stream alteration permits).
Nor could Defendants even rearrange the natural rocks and sand in the Weber River
without first obtaining a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers. U.S. v. Sinclair Oil
Co., 767 F.Supp. 200 (D. Mont. 1990) (holding that "riverbed maintenance" activities,
involving only the relocation of indigenous riverbed materials, required a dredge and fill
permit).
Of course, submerged lands are also burdened by the public easement described in
J.J.N.P.

Thus, owners of submerged lands cannot exclude the public from entering,

without trespass, the boundaries of their property in order to use the public waters
overlying the privately owned lands. Furthermore, even under existing law as articulated
by J.J.N.P., public rights already extend beyond the water itself, unless it is possible to

Where states recognize public rights to use the bed or banks of natural waters, they
almost always limit the right to the land below the "mean" or "ordinary" high water
mark. See, e.g., People v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); State v.
Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231, 1234 (Nev. 1972); Kelley v. MacMullan, 214 N.W.2d 856,
864 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
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"float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful activity," 655 P.2d at 1137,
without invading the airspace overlying the public water and the privately owned
riverbed.
Those are the burdens already imposed on Defendants' fee - they are limited in
their ability to use the land, and in their right to exclude others. Under current law,
articulated in J J.N.P. and correctly applied by the district court, the Conatsers, as
members of the public, already enjoy the right to "invade" Defendants' airspace by
floating down the Weber River where it crosses their property. The district court further
ruled that the Conatsers can even make contact with Defendants' submerged lands to
facilitate their floating. It is hard to comprehend how contact with the bed while wading,
instead of floating, imposes any additional burden on the Defendants.

The Federal

District Court of Montana, applying Montana law, analyzed the respective burdens
imposed by waders:
[T]he private landowner cannot be viewed logically as having
any right to exclude a floater from a Montana stream,
regardless of the fact that the public water passes over a
private streambed. The court acknowledges that not all users
of the public resource float on the water, however, but the
extent of the touching of the private streambed by a wader,
for example, is de minimis and causes no more interference
with private property rights than does a floater.
Madison v. Graham, 126 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1324 (D. Mont. 2001).
In summary, because walking on the bed of the river is a reasonable incidental use
of the public easement in the Weber River, and because such walking does not impose
any additional burden on the servient estate, this Court should hold that the public
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easement in public waters of the state includes the right to walk on the underlying bed as
a use incidental to recreation.
D*

Of the three other "Public Ownership" states, two have held or
suggested that the public has the right to walk on the ground
underlying public waters.

Other states following some variation of the doctrine of "public ownership"
include Wyoming, Montana, and New Mexico. See Dunning, 4 Waters and Water
Rights, § 30.04.9
The most extensive application of the public ownership doctrine comes from a
series of Montana cases. The courts of that state have expressly recognized that public
ownership of water carries with it the right to make incidental contact with submerged
private lands. In the first decision, issued in 1984, the Montana Supreme Court held that,
pursuant to a constitutional declaration, all waters of the state were owned by the public,
and that "the capability of use of the waters for recreational purposes determines their
availability for recreational use by the public." Montana Coalition for Stream Access v.
Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170 (Mont. 1984).

9

The treatise also names Idaho as adhering to the doctrine of public ownership. Id, The
leading Idaho case on public rights in waters, however, relies for the most part on a
statute that essentially adopts a recreational navigability test. See Southern Idaho Fish
and Game Assoc, v. Picabo Livestock Inc., 528 P.2d 1295, 1297 (Idaho 1974)
(describing statutory "log floating" navigability test, and statutory declaration that
"navigable rivers" were "public highways"). In passing, the Idaho Supreme Court also
mentioned that the trial court also based its holding on public ownership of water in
Idaho, pursuant to a constitutional declaration. While the case can be read as adopting
the doctrine of public ownership and declaring broader public rights than afforded by the
statute alone, there is no clear statement to that effect. Id. at 1297-98.
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In Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984),
issued just months after Curran, the Montana Supreme Court clarified that the Curran
holding - that public rights in waters derive from public ownership - was not limited to
federally navigable rivers. In other words, the case held that the public had rights to use
all waters of the state, including those overlying privately owned lands. Id. at 1091-92.
In addition, the Hildreth court confirmed that the public also has the right to use "the bed
and banks up to the ordinary high water mark." Id. at 1091.
Following Curran and Hildreth, the Montana legislature enacted a stream access
law that not only codified, but expanded on the Curran and Hildreth holdings. In Gait v.
State Dept. of Fish and Wildlife, 731 P.2d 912 (Mont. 1987), the court considered the
statute, which allowed the public the right to, among other things, build duck blinds, boat
moorings, and to camp overnight, on the beds and banks of all state waters, beyond a
minimum distance from occupied dwellings. Id. at 914-15. The court found these more
intrusive uses of the bed to be outside the scope of the public easement, id. at 915,
reasoning that "[wjhile the public has the right to use the water for recreational purposes
and minimal use of the underlying and adjoining real estate essential to enjoyment of its
ownership in water, there is no attendant right that such use be as convenient, productive,
and comfortable as possible."10 Id.

The Conatsers have not sought in this declaratory judgment action any rights that
would be intrusive or burdensome on Defendants' fee, such as the public rights found
overly burdensome in Gait. The Conatsers do not seek the right to go above the mean
high water mark, or to camp on the banks, or to affix permanent fixtures to the riverbed.
See Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1969) (holding that public held right to fish in
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Finally, in Madison v. Graham, 126 F.Supp.2d 1320 (D. Mont. 2001), the federal
district court for Montana considered and dismissed another challenge to Montana's
stream access law. The court reasoned that touching of the private streambed by waders
did not infringe on the plaintiffs property interests, because "the extent of the touching
of the private streambed by a wader, for example, is de minimis and causes no more
interference with private property rights than does a floater." Id. at 1324.
The Montana cases are persuasive, not only because they offer the most extensive
and recent discussion of the public ownership doctrine, but because they are the most
carefully reasoned.
A less well-reasoned approach is illustrated by Wyoming law.

In Day v.

Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961), the Wyoming Supreme Court rightly dismissed
the question of navigability - and the case law discussing it - as unnecessary, "because
by our Constitution and its Congressional approval, the title of all waters of the State is
placed in public ownership." Id. at 144. The Day court described the purpose of public
ownership of water as "the benefit of the people," id. at 145, and expressly rejected
navigability as a test to "determine other uses to which the State may put its waters." Id.
at 144. The court even held that the public waters are "available for such uses by the
public of which they are capable." Id. at 145. Yet when the court examined the scope of
the public easement, it inexplicably slipped back into a navigation framework, and
seemed to consider floating the only relevant public use. Id. at 145-46. Specifically, the
non-federally navigable river "with ordinary paraphernalia," but that fixing trot line to
privately owned riverbed was a trespass). Rather, the Conatsers seek through this appeal
only the right to stand and walk on the bed of the Weber River while they fish.
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court held that the public had the right to float on public waters overlying private lands,
along with the incidental right to make contact with the private riverbeds in order to
facilitate floating. Id. at 146. Any contact with the bed not incidental to floating,
however, was held to be a trespass, even though the waters were deemed public and
available for any use "of which they are capable." Id. Like the district court in this
action, the Wyoming court's narrow definition of the purpose of the public easement led
to an unduly narrow set of allowable incidental uses.
New Mexico law on this point is less clear, but it appears that New Mexico would
recognize the right to walk on the bed as an incident to public use of publicly owned
waters. In State v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421 (N.M. 1947), the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that the public enjoyed the right to fish in portions of a reservoir
overlying private lands. The court reasoned that, pursuant to a constitutional declaration,
all waters in New Mexico were public, and that the right of fishery inhered in all public
waters. Id. at 430-31. Though public rights to wade were not at issue, id. at 427, a
heated, pro-surface estate dissent had little trouble concluding that if, as the majority
held, all waters were public, "they are no less so when they flow across an owner's land
at a depth requiring one to tread upon the land itself in order to enjoy fishery in them.
Obviously, the logic and rationale of today's holding is that the fisherman so treading
will not be a trespasser." Id. at 451 (Sadler, J., dissenting).
The simple logic of the Red River Valley dissent is compelling, and bears
repeating: if waters are public, and if the public enjoys the right to use those waters for
recreational purposes such as fishing, then it follows that the public should have the right
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to make normal, non-intrusive use of the underlying soil as an incident to their fishing
activities. This rationale, which is also at the heart of the Montana precedent, is a
straightforward application of familiar rules of real property, and should be adopted by
this Court.
The district court's ruling, on the other hand, is in error, because it improperly
relies on navigability in its analysis of public rights in waters. Compare Judgment, Rec.
at 00310 ("Wading or walking along the river, where such conduct is not incidental to the
right of floatation upon natural waters, would constitute a trespass...") with J.J.N.P., 655
P.2d at 1136 (stating that navigability "does not establish the extent of the State's interest
in the waters of the State."). While navigability may have been well-suited in medieval
England as a test for public rights, it simply has no place in this arid state, where
navigation has never been a significant use of natural waters. Here, the waters belong to
all of us, and may be used for floating, hunting, fishing, or any other lawful activities.
JJ.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136-37.

When minimal use of the underlying streambed is

reasonably necessary in order to use the public waters for those purposes, the public
should have that right. Otherwise, the public will be deprived of the full use of the "gift
of Providence," Adams, 72 P.2d at 652, and large stretches of our rivers will be
essentially locked up as private fisheries.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Conatsers urge this Court to reverse that portion of
the district court's ruling wherein the court concluded, as a matter of law, that touching of
the streambed on Defendants' property is permissible only when it is incidental to
29

navigating the Weber River in a watercraft, see Judgment, Record ("Rec") at 00310, and
to declare that the Conatsers, as members of the general public, have the right to walk on
the bed of the Weber River and wade in its waters while fishing therein.
Dated this 14th day of December, 2006.

ROBERTH^UGHES
MICHAEL M. QUEALY
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
GERALD E. NIELSON
PARKER M. NIELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants Jodi
Conatser, Kevin Conatser, Lacey Conatser,
and Nicole Mann
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I hereby certify that on this 14th day of December, 2006, I caused to be mailed, first
class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, to:
Gerald E. Nielson
Counsel for Plaintiffs
3737 Honeycut Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Parker M. Nielson
Counsel for Plaintiffs
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Ronald G. Russell
Royce B. Covington
Counsel for Defendants
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
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Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134)
Royce B. Covington, Esq. (10160)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendants Lynn Brown,
Duane Johnson, Wayne Johnson,
Michael McMillan, and Randy Sessions
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Post Office Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019
Telephone: (801) 532-7840

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR MORGAN COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JODICONATSER; KEVIN CONATSER;
LACEY CONATSER; and NICOLE
MANN,
Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT

vs.
WAYNE JOHNSON; CLARK SESSIONS;
SHANE E. MATTHEWS, Deputy Sheriff
of Morgan County; DUANE JOHNSON;
RANDY SESSIONS; MICHAEL
McMILLAN; LYNN BROWN; GERALD
STOUT; and JOHN AND JANE DOES,
6-25,

Civil No. 000500092PR

Defendants.

The court having issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and for the reasons
set forth therein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs, as members of the public, if they can gain lawful access to the Weber

River, have the right to float leisure craft and participate in any lawful activity when upon the
water.
2.

The defendants have no legal right to prevent plaintiffs from making use of the

public's easement to float down the Weber River.
3.

The defendants have no legal right to erect fences to prevent plaintiffs from

utilizing the public's easement to float down the river.
4.

When floating upon the river, defendants may scrape or touch the river's bed by

grounding of craft as a necessary incident to the use of the public's easement to float upon the
river and do not commit a trespass thereby.
5.

The right to disembark and pull, push, or carry over shoals, rapids, or obstacles

accompanies the right of floatation upon natural waters, which plaintiffs enjoy as members of the
public.
6.

Plaintiffs may walk along the banks of the river to "bypass a fence, obstacle, or

danger in order to continue floating and so long as plaintiffs' actions are as minimally intrusive
as possible of the private owners' land, there is no trespass.
7.

Where the use of the streambed is more than incidental to the right of floating on

natural waters, such use would constitute a trespass.
8.

Wading or walking along the river, where such conduct is not incidental to the right

of floatation upon natural waters, would constitute a trespass of private property rights.
2

9.

Plaintiffs have the right to make use of the river provided they stay within the

bounds of the holding of J.J.N.P. Co. v. State Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982)
and this Judgment.
10. This declaratory Judgment is binding only on the parties to this action.
11. Except as to the declaratory relief provided by this Judgment, all claims and causes
of action herein are dismissed and this Judgment constitutes a final Judgment for all purposes.
12. The parties shall bear their own costs.
DATED this

^ 3 day of

Mj.

2006.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Michael D. |Lyo:
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Gerald E. Nielson, Esq
Attome*rfor Plaintiff!

Ronald G. j&ussell, Esq.
Royce B. Covington, Esq. of
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendants Lynn Brown,
Duane Johnson, Wayne Johnson,
Michael McMillan, and Randy Sessions
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the / Q l Jiay of April, 2006 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Gerald E. Nielson, Esq.
3737 Honeycut Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Parker M. Nielson, Esq.
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kelly W.Wright, Esq.
Post Office Box 886
48 West Young Street
Morgan, Utah 84050
Brent A. Bohman, Esq.
157 North Commercial Street, Suite 3
Post Office Box 120
Morgan, Utah 84050
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Attorneys for Defendants Lynn Brown,
Duane Johnson, Wayne Johnson,
Michael McMillan, and Randy Sessions
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Post Office Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 000500092PR
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On September 17,2002, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment. On May 17,
2005, defendants, excepting Shane E. Matthews, cross-moved for summary judgment. The court
heard oral argument on both motions September 30,2005. Plaintiffs were represented by Gerald
E. Nielson. Defendants were represented by Ronald G. Russell After full consideration of the

motions, the memoranda of points and legal authoritiesfiledtherewith, the Affidavit of Kevin
Conatser, and all other memoranda, pleadings, and papers on file with the court, the court makes
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about June 4,2000, plaintiffs put a rubber raft in the Weber River at a public

access point and proceeded to float down the river to another public access point.
2.

Between the public access points, the river crosses parcels of private property.

3.

While floating the river, the plaintiffs touched the streambed in the following ways:

(i) the raft in which they were riding touched or skidded along the bottom of the river in shallow
areas, (ii) the paddles or oars touched the bottom on occasion, (iii) Kevin Conatser's fishing
tackle came in contact with the bottom, and (iv) Kevin Conatser intentionally got out of the raft
and walked along the streambed to facilitate his fishing and to manipulate fencing that had been
strung over the river.
4.

On at least two occasions prior to June 4,2000, the defendants informed the

plaintiffs that they were trespassing. On one occasion, defendant Michael McMillan confronted
Kevin Conatser and ordered him off the river. On another occasion, Kevin Conatser was ordered
off the river by Clark Sessions.
5.

On June 4,2000, defendants Duane Johnson and Wayne Johnson confronted the

plaintiffs and ordered them off the river. Defendants Duane Johnson and Wayne Johnson told
the plaintiffs to pick up their raft out of the river and walk out via a parallel railroad easement.
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6.

The plaintiffs continued downstream to a public access point where the defendants

Duane Johnson and Wayne Johnson and a Morgan County Deputy Sheriff were waiting.
7.

The deputy sheriff cited plaintiffs for criminal trespass.

8.

The Morgan County Justice Court later found plaintiffs guilty of criminal trespass.

9.

The plaintiffs appealed the justice court's findings.

10. After appeal, the county moved to dismiss the trespass charges in light of the
uncertainty regarding the Conatsers' status as trespassers.
11. There is a longstanding and continuing uncertainty between the plaintiffs and
defendants regarding the plaintiffs5 rights to use the river.
12. Both the plaintiffs and defendants have actively sought to assert the rights each side
believes the law provides to them. Their dispute comes notfroma disregard of the law, but a
genuine uncertainty as to their respective rights.
13. The parties' dispute regarding use of the river has not ceased but has been placed
on hold out of respect for the role of the courts.
14. The parties have provided the court with no evidence of whether the river has. been
used for commerce or of the river's capability to be so used.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes the court to declare the respective

rights or status between parties.
2.

The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to settle and afford relief from

uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.
3

3.

The Declaratory Judgment Act is intended to be remedial without requiring parties

to get in serious trouble first and it is to be liberally administered.
4.

The following four requirements must be met before the court can issue a

declaratory judgment: (i) there must be a justiciable controversy, (ii) parties whose interests are
diverse, (iii) a legally protectible interest residing with the party seeking relief, and (iv) issues
ripe for judicial determination.
5.

The Declaratory Judgment Act allows for a wide interpretation of what constitutes

a justiciable controversy. This case presents a justiciable controversy, ripe for judicial
determination, between private citizens whose interests are adverse, and have been so over time,
regarding the rights and limitations of the plaintiffs when floating the river abutting and running
over defendants' property.
6.

A justiciable controversy is present in this case. Because the plaintiffs' interests to

the river are in direct conflict with the defendants' attempts to prevent the plaintiffs' use of the
river, the parties are adverse. ~
7.

The issue here is ripe for determination. The plaintiffs have had clashes with the

defendants presenting a concrete set of facts regarding the plaintiffs' actual use of the river. This
case does not present an academic controversy and it is not an effort by plaintiffs to obtain an
advisory opinion.
8.

The plaintiffs have a legally protectible interest in the controversy. The river

belongs to the public and plaintiffs, as members of the public, have a legally protectible interest
in the public easement over these natural watersfreeof defendants' interference. Plaintiffs have
4

repeatedly used a portion of the river. The defendants have interfered with the plaintiffs' use of
the river. Plaintiffs Kevin Conatser and Jodi Conatser were arrested and convicted of criminal
trespass, although the charges were later dismissed.
9.

The plaintiffs' interest is apartfromthe general public. The plaintiffs have

repeatedly used a particular portion of the river, intend to continue doing so, and have suffered a
particularized injury of interference. The defendants have individually interfered with the
plaintiffs' use of the river on multiple occasions.
10. A legally protectible interest does not require a property interest.
11. A declaratory judgment will end the uncertainty and therewith the instant
controversy.
12. The plaintiffs have requested a broad declaration of plaintiffs1 and the public's
rights to use the river and waters located in Utah; however, a declaratory judgment only settles
the legal rights between the parties to the proceeding. The court's judgment will not exceed the
plaintiffs' interests or prejudice any persons who have not been made a party to the proceeding.
For this reason, the court cannot consider the broad relief requested by the plaintiffs.
13. The court can only declare the rights to use of the river as between the plaintiffs
and defendants.
14. A fair determination as to the respective rights between the defendants and
plaintiffs on claims arising from their own behavior will not prejudice any person not made a
party to this case. Therefore, the State of Utah and the record owners of the property in question
are not necessary parties.
5

15. The court denies plaintiffs' request for a declaration that the public has a right to
walk along the beds of streams and rivers. Such a declaration would require the weighing of
competing interests and is a matter better left for the legislature.
16. A declaratory judgment will end the present controversy. This case is ideally
situated to the stated purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act. This case is properly before the
court and a declaration of the respective rights between the plaintiffs and defendants is
appropriate.
17. The declaration made by the court in this case is binding only on those made
-parties hereto and no one else.
18. The court exercises its discretion to grant a declaratory judgment in this case
because it feels that it is the place of a court to obviate future potential confrontations between
the parties and to facilitate a peaceful co-existence. Otherwise, people resort to self-help and
anarchy.
19. This case does not require either a determination of bed ownership or navigability.
20.

All waters in the state are the property of the public. Individuals, therefore, have

no ownership interest in natural waters.
21.

The public does not trespass when upon natural waters, regardless of who owns the

bed beneath the water.
22.

Irrespective of the ownership of the bed and irrespective of the navigability of the

water, the public, if it can gain lawful access to a body of water, has the right tofloatleisure craft
and participate in any lawful activity when upon the water.
6

23.

The right to be on public waters applies to the section of the river at issue in this

case.
24. The defendants have no legal right to prevent plaintiffs from making use of the
public's easement to float down the river.
25. The defendants have no legal right to erect fences to prevent the plaintiffs from
utilizing the public's easement to float down the river.
26.

When floating down the river, a person may scrape or touch the river's bed by

grounding of craft. These are necessary incidents to the use of the easement and do not
constitute trespass.
27. The right to disembark and pull, push, or carry over shoals, rapids, or obstacles
accompanies the right of floatation on natural waters.
28. A person may walk along the banks in order to bypass a fence, obstacle, or danger
in order to continue floating.
29. Provided a person is as minimally intrusive of the private owners' land as possible,
there is no trespass.
30. Where the use of the streambed is more that incidental to the right of floating on
natural waters, such use constitutes a trespass.
31.

Plaintiffs have the right to make use of the river provided they stay within the

bounds of the holding of J.J.N.P. Co. v. State Div. of Wildlife Res.. 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982)
and this decision.
32. This decision is binding only on the parties hereto.
7

33. The court will enter a declaratory judgment consistent with the foregoing
conclusions.
DATED this

^ 7 day of

Mf{.

2006.

BY THE COURT:

Honorable Michael D/lMm
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Gerald E. Nielson, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Ronald G. Russell, Esq.
Royce B. Covington, Esq. of
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendants Lynn Brown,
Duane Johnson, Wayne Johnson,
Michael McMillan, and Randy Sessions
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I hereby certify that on the _J^_^day of April, 2006 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed, postage prepaid,
to:
Gerald E. Nielson, Esq.
3737 Honeycut Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Parker M. Nielson, Esq.
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kelly W. Wright, Esq.
Post Office Box 886
48 West Young Street
Morgan, Utah 84050
Brent A. Bohman, Esq.
157 North Commercial Street, Suite 3
Post Office Box 120
Morgan, Utah 84050
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MORGAN COU^Y^TjATE.OT UTAH

JODICONATSER, KEVIN CONATSER,
LACEY CONATSER, and NICOLE
MANN,
Plaintiffs,

Qgg

WAYNE JOHNSON, CLARK
SESSIONS, SHANE E. MATTHEWS,
Deputy Sheriff of Morgan County,
DUANE JOHNSON, RANDY
SESSIONS, MICHAEL McMILLAN,
LYNN BROWN, GERALD STOUT,
JOHN and JANE DOES 6-25.

"-:iS::;;C7 COURT

MEMORANDUM DECISION
GRANTING DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT
Civil No. 050ff0181?Judge Michael D. Lyon

Defendants.

This action for a declaratory judgment arises out of a dispute between these
parties regarding the Plaintiffs' rights to use a portion of the Weber River. The Plaintiffs
moved for summary judgment on September 17,2002. The Court previously granted a
motion to dismiss Defendant Shane E. Matthews. On September 30,2005, the remaining
Defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the Defendants' claims. The Court
heard oral argument on September 30,2005. Following the hearing, both parties
submitted supplemental briefs on the issue of Plaintiffs' standing. Having now carefully
considered the parties' briefs and having heard argument, the Court denies the
Defendants' motion in part and gives a declaratory judgment.
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Background
The relevant facts are not in dispute. On or about June 4,2000, Plaintiffs put a
rubber raft in the Weber River at a public access point and proceeded to float down the
river to another public access point where they exited the river. Between the public
access points, the river crosses parcels of property that are in private ownership.
Plaintiffs touched the streambed in the following ways: (1) the raft in which they rode
touched or skidded along the bottom in shallow areas, (2) their paddles or oars touched
the bottom on occasion, (3) Plaintiff Kevin Conatser's fishing tackle came in contact with
the bottom, (4) Kevin Conatser intentionally got out of the raft, and walked along the
bottom of the river to facilitate hisfishingand to manipulate fencing that had been strung
over the river by the property owners.
On two occasions prior to June 4,2000, the Defendants told the Plaintiffs that
they were trespassing. On June 4, 2000, Defendants Duane Johnson and Wayne Johnson
confronted the Plaintiffs and ordered Plaintiffs off of the river. Specifically, Duane and
Wayne Johnson told the Plaintiffs to pick up their raft and walk out via a parallel railroad
easement. The Plaintiffs refused to walk out and continued downstream to a public
access point, where the Johnsons and the Morgan County Deputy Sheriff were waiting
for them. The Deputy Sheriff cited Mr. and Mrs. Conatser for criminal trespass. The
Morgan County Justice Court found the Plaintiffs guilty. After Plaintiffs appeal to the
district court, the county moved to dismiss the charges because of the uncertainty
regarding the Conatsers' status as trespassers.
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Analysis
A, Plaintiffs Meet the Requirements to Seek a Declaratory Judgment
Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes the Court to declare the respective
rights or status between parties. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1. The purpose of the
Declaratory Judgment Act is to "settle and afford relieffromuncertainty and insecurity
with respect to rights, status and other legal relations" and it is to be liberally
administered. Id. at § 78-33-12; Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119,121
(Utah 1977) (stating that courts "will be indulgent in entertaining actions to achieve [the
Act's] objective). Nevertheless, four requirements must be met before the Court can give
a declaratory judgment: "(1) there must be a justiciable controversy, (2) parties whose
interests are adverse, (3) a legally protectible interest residing with the party seeking
relief, and (4) issues ripe for judicial determination." Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 597
(Utah 2003) (citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145,1148 (Utah 1983)).
The Declaratory Judgment Act "allows for a wide interpretation of what
constitutes a justiciable controversy." Salt Lake Co. Comm 'n v. Short, 985 P.2d 899, 903
(Utah 1999). It is sufficient that the parties are adverse, the^plaintiff asserts a bona fide
claim, and the issues are ripe for adjudication. Id. In this case, the parties are adverse as
the Plaintiffs' interests to be on the river are directly in conflict with the Defendants'
attempts to prevent the Plaintiffs' use.
An issue is ripe for determination when it has "sharpened into an actual or
imminent clash of rights" and where the issue presents a concrete set of facts. Pett v.
AutolivASP, Inc., 106 P.3d 705, 706 (stating that a mere difference of opinion regarding
a hypothetical application of the law to a situation in which the parties might one day find
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themselves is unripe). The Plaintiffs have had actual clashes with the Defendants on
several occasions. This case presents a concrete set of facts regarding the Plaintiffs'
actual use of this portion of the Weber River. This case does not present an academic
controversy or require an advisory opinion.
The Plaintiffs must also have a legally protectible interest in the controversy. A
legally protectible interest is "one that the substantive law recognizes as belonging to or
being owned by the party," Alternative Options and Services for Children v. Chapman,
106 P 3d 744, 750 (Utah Ct App. 2004) (quoting In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 1 P.3d
1074 (Utah 2000)). This requires that the plaintiff have an interest that is distinct from
that shared by the general public. Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148-50 (holding that the airing of
generalized grievances and the vindication of public rights are properly addressed to the
legislature). In Jenkins, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment stating that public
schools could not hire state legislators. Id. at 1148. The court held that plaintiffs
reliance on his status as a taxpayer and citizen "d[id] nothing to distinguish himself from
any member of the public at large," and that the plaintiff did not claim any particularized
injury. Id. at 1151 (stating that plaintiff lacked the harm that persons living in the
affected school districts or legislative districts would have).
In this case, the Plaintiffs have repeatedly used a portion of the Weber River. The
Defendants have individually interfered with Plaintiffs' use of the river on multiple
occasions. Plaintiffs Kevin Conatser and Jodi Conatser were arrested and convicted,
although dismissed on de novo appeal, of criminal trespass in the justice court. Although
the Plaintiffs share an interest in using Utah's natural waters with the general public, the
Plaintiffs have also repeatedly used a particular portion of the Weber River, intend to
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continue doing so, and have suffered particularized injury of interference, which sets
them apartfromthe general public.
A legally protectible interest requires that Plaintiffs' interest be protectible.
Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 597 (Utah 2003). Once given, a declaratory judgment
must be able to provide specific relief. Id In Miller, the plaintiffs sought a declaration
that a teacher's classroom conduct was unconstitutional. Id. The court refused to give a
declaratory judgment because its declaration would not terminate the uncertainty or end
the controversy. Id. The court noted that a declaratory judgment would not serve a
useful purpose as the teacher would remain employed, students would continue to be
placed in her class, and the school board would still have the discretion to refuse action
on the plaintiffs' complaints. -Id. The Defendants argue that a legally protectible interest
requires some property interest. The Court disagrees. Here, the Plaintiffs seek a
declaration of the respective rights between themselves and these Defendants. The Court
finds that there is a longstanding and continuing uncertainty between these parties
regarding Plaintiffs' rights to use this portion of the river. Both the Plaintiffs and the
Defendants have actively sought to assert the rights each side believes the law provides to
them. Their dispute comes notfroma disregard of the law, but a genuine uncertainty as
to their respective rights. A declaratory judgment will end this uncertainty and therewith
the controversy.
The Plaintiffs have requested a broad declaration of the public's rights to rivers
and waters in Utah. A declaratory judgment only settles the legal rights between the
parties to the proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11. The Court's judgment will not
exceed the Plaintiffs' interests or prejudice any persons not made parties to the
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proceeding. For this reason, the Court cannot consider the broad relief requested by the
Plaintiffs. The Court will only declare the Plaintiffs' rights to use the river with respect
to these Defendants. Similarly, the Defendants argued that the State of Utah and the
record owners of the property in question are necessary parties. However, a fair
determination as to the respective rights between these particular parties on claims arising
from their own behavior will not prejudice any person not made a party to this case.
The Plaintiffs have asked the Court to declare as a matter of law that the public
has the right to walk along the beds of streams and rivers. Plaintiffs cite to Montana law,
which has recognized this right. See Montana Code Ann. § 23-2-301 et seq. Declaring
such a right would require the weighing of competing interests that is better left for the
legislature. The Court, therefore, denies this relief.
The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to resolve controversies and
uncertainty. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-12. The act is intended to be remedial without
requiring parties to get in serious trouble first. Alternative Options and Services for
Children, 106 P.3d at 749. Prior to June 4,2000, Defendant Michael McMillan
confronted Kevin Conatser and ordered him off the river. Kevin Conatser's Aff. at f 3.
On another occasion prior to June 4,2000, Clark Sessions acting for Randy Sessions
ordered Kevin Conatser off of the river. Id. at f 4. There have been threats of violence
between these parties. Verified Complaint at f 11. The Conatser's were arrested and
convicted of criminal trespass. The Courtfindsthat there has been a continuing
controversy between these parties for years. The Defendants argue that because the
hostilities and use of the river have ceased, a declaratory judgment is inappropriate.
However, the Court finds that the parties' dispute has not ceased, but has been placed on
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hold out of respect for the role of the courts. A declaratory judgment will end this
controversy. This case is ideally suited to the stated purpose of the Declaratory
Judgment Act. The Court, therefore, concludes that this case is properly before the Court
and that a declaration of the respective rights between these parties is appropriate.
B. Plaintiffs9 Use of the Public Easement to Float on Natural Waters Does Not
Constitute a Trespass
The parties urge the Court to make a determination of the navigability of the
Weber River. The parties have provided the Court with no evidence of whether the
Weber River has ever been used for commerce or of the river's capability to be so used.
The Court, therefore, will not address navigability on this motion. However, as discussed
below, this case does not require either a determination of bed ownership or navigability.
"AH waters" in this state are the property of the public. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1.
Individuals, therefore, have no ownership interest in natural waters. The Utah Supreme
Court has recognized a public easement over natural waters. J J.N.P. Co. v. State Div. of
Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982). The public does not trespass when upon
natural waters, regardless of who owns the bed beneath the water. Id "Irrespective of
the ownership of the bed and irrespective of navigability of the water, the public, if it can
obtain lawful access to a body of water, has the right to float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and
participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that water." Id. (citing Day v. Armstrong,
362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961). This right to be on public waters applies to the section of the
Weber River at issue in this case. The Defendants have no legal right to prevent the
Plaintiffs from making use of the public's easement to float down the Weber River. The
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Defendants have no legal right to erect fences to prevent the Plaintiffs from utilizing the
public's easement to float down the river.
When floating on natural waters, a person may scrape the river bed or touch the
bed by the grounding of craft. Day, 362 P.2d at 146. These are necessary incidents to the
use of that easement and do not constitute a trespass. Id. at 145-46. Even the "right to
disembark and pull, push, or carry over shoals, rapids, or obstacles accompany the right
of flotation" on natural waters. Id. at 146. A person may walk along the banks in order
to bypass an obstacle or danger in order to continue floating. Id As long as the person is
as minimally intrusive on the private owner's land as possible there is no trespass. Id.
However, where the use of the stream bed is more than incidental to the right of
floating on natural waters, the use constitutes a trespass. Id. This would include wading
or walking along the river. In this case, the Plaintiffs, with the exception of Kevin
Conatser, never left their raft and, therefore, did not trespass on the property in question.
When Kevin Conatser got back in his raft he was no longer trespassing. Walking out
along the parallel railroad easement was unnecessary. These rights are both already
recognized in Utah and in line with the clear majority of western states.
Conclusion
This case presents a justiciable controversy, ripe for judicial determination,
between private citizens whose interests are adverse, and have been so over time,
regarding the rights and limitations of the Plaintiffs when floating the Weber River
abutting the Defendants' property. The Weber River belongs to the public, and the
Defendants, as members of the public, have a legally protectibie interest in the public
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easement over these natural waters, free of Defendants' interference, provided they stay
within the bounds of the holding of 1JNP. Co.
In granting the circumscribed relief found in this decision, the Court settles the
longstanding and continuing uncertainty and insecurity concerning the parties' rights to
the river. In doing so, it declares the rights of the parties only, no one else. The Court
exercises its discretion to grant a declaratory judgment because it feels that it is the place
of a court to obviate future potential confrontations between the parties and to facilitate a
peaceful co-existence. If courts do not act in these situations in society, people resort to
self-help and anarchy.
The Court requests that Mr. Russell prepare the appropriatefindingsof fact,
conclusions of law, and judgment.
Dated this \tf

day of December, 2005.

Michael D. Lybn, Judge

j)
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